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Model Uncertainty and Policy Choice:
A Plea for Integrated Subjectivism
Alistair M. C. Isaac∗
May 22, 2014
Abstract
A question at the intersection of scientific modeling and public choice
is how to deal with uncertainty about model predictions. This “high-
level” uncertainty is necessarily value-laden, and thus must be treated as
irreducibly subjective. Nevertheless, formal methods of uncertainty anal-
ysis should still be employed for the purpose of clarifying policy debates.
I argue that such debates are best informed by models which integrate
objective features (which model the world) with subjective ones (model-
ing the policy-maker). This integrated subjectivism is illustrated with a
case study from the literature on monetary policy. The paper concludes
with some morals for the use of models in determining climate policy.
1 Introduction
A question at the intersection of scientific modeling and public choice is how to
deal with uncertainty about model predictions. This “high-level” uncertainty
appears to be qualitatively different from the “low-level” uncertainties which
occur during model construction. Low-level uncertainties may be reduced sys-
tematically through further measurement or experimentation. In contrast, there
is no widespread agreement on a systematic procedure for reducing high-level
uncertainty. Yet it is model predictions which are relevant for policy choice, and
thus a realistic recommendation for the use of scientific models to inform policy
must address the fact of high-level uncertainty.
I argue that high-level uncertainty, as well as other values critical for policy
choice, should be treated as irreducibly “subjective.” I use this term primarily
to indicate properties of a subject, e.g. a scientist or policy-maker, in contrast
to “objective,” or subject-independent, properties of the world. The point of
emphasizing that high-level uncertainty is always subjective in this sense is to
counterbalance a widespread misconception that typical representations of sci-
entific uncertainty are insulated from contentious value judgments. When policy
∗University of Edinburgh, contact: a.m.c.isaac@ed.ac.uk.
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decisions must be made under conditions of scientific disagreement, this miscon-
ception motivates a spurious argument from the lack of scientific consensus to
the impossibility of quantifying uncertainty and applying formal decision rules.
I defend decision theory in this context, in contrast with those who take such
high-level uncertainties to defeat formal methods, for instance proponents of the
precautionary principle.
Integrated subjectivism is the view that, in order to inform policy choice, a
scientific model should be converted to a decision-theoretic one by supplement-
ing it with parameters which represent relevant subjective properties of the
policy-maker, e.g. her utility function, priors, or risk aversion. This strategy in-
tegrates subjective features into a model which may be interpreted as otherwise
objective. I motivate this view with an example from the literature on optimal
monetary policy. This example illustrates how including more of a scientific
model in the decision-making process than just a probability distribution over
outcomes can both constrain rational policy in novel ways and make explicit
the loci of disagreement in policy debates. This possibility mitigates to some
extent worries about the irreducibly subjective nature of high-level uncertainty
when it plays a role in public choice. The paper concludes with some remarks
on the application of these ideas to the current debate on climate policy.
2 High-Level Uncertainty
Not all “uncertainty” exhibits the same qualitative features. Agreement about
how to represent and reduce uncertainty will differ depending upon both the
source of the uncertainty and its consequences for prospective action.
For instance, the treatment of uncertainty about the parameter values used
when constructing a model appears straightforward: we represent it with error
bars, the standard deviation, or some other descriptive statistical technique.
This “low-level” uncertainty is typically just variance in the data, and can be
reduced by making more measurements, developing more precise measurement
procedures, running additional experiments, etc.1 Suppose two ecologists mod-
eling the growth of the invasive cane toad (Bufo marinus) population in Aus-
tralia disagree about the cane toad birth rate, one of the parameters in the
model. Despite disagreement about parameter value, they nevertheless agree on
the types of evidence relevant for resolving that disagreement, e.g. additional
observations of cane toad breeding in the wild, collection of data on similar
toads, experiments on cane toad breeding in various controlled test conditions,
etc. Consequently, each modeler knows the actions relevant for convincing her
1Some parameters cannot be measured directly. Nevertheless, uncertainty about their
values can still be reduced by established techniques, for instance statistical estimation. Parker
(2010) argues there are cases in which the “best” value to use for a parameter may differ from
our best estimate of the quantity it represents—for instance, if deviation from the parameter’s
presumed “true” value corrects for imperfections in other parts of the model, improving overall
performance (990). In this case, the uncertainty at issue is not about the value of the parameter
per se, but about the rest of the model, and the pragmatic trade-offs required to improve it.
2
colleague, and, as evidence accrues, their views should eventually converge on a
single value.
The treatment of uncertainty about the predictions of complex models ap-
pears much more problematic. This “high-level” uncertainty derives from a
heterogenous set of methodological choices made by the modeler concerning rel-
evance and idealization. For instance, when building a model of the spread of
cane toads throughout Australia, one must decide which parameters to include
(predation? rainfall? pond size?) as well as the degree of spatial and temporal
granularity of the model (should it partition the continent into square miles?
square 100 miles? square feet?). Even the inclusion of “obviously” relevant
parameters may be questioned (e.g. Kearney et al., 2008, model the future dis-
tribution of cane toads across the continent without including a parameter for
the current data on cane toad location, an intuitively relevant value and one
typically included in other models).
The question of which parameters are relevant for a model is a specific facet
of the more general point that models typically idealize, abstract from, distort,
or at least simplify the target system they are intended to represent.2 Modelers
who identify different features of the target system as relevant are idealizing
differently, yet there is no consensus theory for evaluating the relative merits of
these choices. In the context of “pure” inquiry, long-term empirical success will
eventually resolve disagreements about model idealization, but in the context
of policy choice, the luxury of waiting for long-term success is typically not
available.
Consider, for example, two hypothetical models of cane toad territory expan-
sion. They include some of the same parameters, representing rough geograph-
ical features of Australia, yet they calculate changes in cane toad distribution
using very different methods. The first is built by a statistician and relies on
analysis of trends in past toad movements to predict future cane toad distribu-
tion. The second is built by a biologist and relies on an analysis of the cane
toad’s physiological and behavioral traits (leap length, daily period of activity,
etc.) for generating its predictions. These two models exhibit different virtues.
The first can reproduce past data, “predicting” the current distribution of cane
toads when fed only their initial location upon introduction in 1935; the second
is unable to reproduce this data, but has the virtue of accurately capturing the
presumed mechanism of cane toad migration. If our interest in the question of
cane toad distribution is purely “academic,” we may tweak and improve these
models gradually as we observe actual cane toad spread.
In contrast, if our intent is to make a policy decision, say, how much to
spend on culling cane toads this year, then we don’t have the luxury of waiting
2This is a general feature of scientific inquiry: we understand some aspect of nature by
crystalizing out an efficient description of it, for instance in terms of the laws which govern
it. A complete and uncondensed representation of nature would be as useless as Borges’ map
the size of the territory. Although I focus here on models in particular in order to make
contact with some specific examples, the considerations raised in this article should apply
equally to the use of any aspect of scientific theory in policy decisions. (For an introduction
to abstraction, idealization, and distortion in models, see for instance Morgan and Morrison,
1999, esp. Ch. 2; or Weisberg, 2013, Ch. 6.)
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for long-term success. We need a method for evaluating now the predictions
made by each model when they differ on some relevant issue, say, whether or
not cane toads will reach Perth if left unchecked. Which virtue should we weigh
more: success in reproducing past data or plausibility of mechanism? There
is no consensus answer to this question, nor general theory for how to rank
the importance of other scientific virtues such as elegance, precision, accuracy,
or generality when weighing the merits of incompatible models. Although this
example is artificial, it illustrates a general property of time-sensitive model
evaluation: it is irreducibly value-laden.
High-level uncertainty is qualitatively different from low-level uncertainty in
that there is no consensus on how to represent or reduce it. This is a consequence
of the fact that model construction involves trade-offs between competing sci-
entific values (Levins, 1966). Even when a modeling subcommunity exhibits
de facto agreement over which trade-offs should be made, this “value consen-
sus” does not translate into consensus on how to reduce uncertainty over model
predictions. Furthermore, such localized consensus can be misleading, blind-
ing modelers to the substantive contribution made by implicit value choices to
overall uncertainty. Arguably, this is the situation in climate science, where the
community has chosen to focus on large models of the physical mechanisms of
climate, rather than the kind of simple, general models of relations between spe-
cific quantities popular in other sciences of complex systems, such as economics
or ecology. The point is not that climate science should emulate economics, but
rather that the choice to focus on models of a particular type is itself made
under conditions of uncertainty, and thus a substantive, yet easily overlooked,
contributor to high-level uncertainty.3
In general, scientific predictions that are relevant for public policy are typi-
cally subject to some degree of high-level uncertainty. This creates a tension in
the way science is discussed in the public sphere, including the pronouncements
and actions of scientists themselves when communicating with the public. Typ-
ically, policy-relevant issues are publicly discussed in binary terms (is “global
warming” occurring (or not)? does lowering interest rates promote economic
growth (or not)?), yet the relevant science is more appropriately framed in
terms of degrees of certainty or evidential support (what is our degree of cer-
tainty in warming? what is the strength of evidence for a human contribution to
warming? under what conditions do lower interest rates promote growth; what
is our degree of certainty that they obtain?). A public rhetoric of bivalence
obscures the nature of the scientific contribution to our knowledge of the world
and undermines its effective use in policy choice.
Symptoms of this breakdown between the actualities of scientific modeling
3Levins (1966) argued that models can result in scientific knowledge, despite trade-offs
amongst conflicting values, if they produce results which are robust, i.e. obtain across a va-
riety of different simplifying assumptions (423)—in our terminology, high-level uncertainty is
reduced when models that prioritize different values agree. This notion of robustness is radi-
cally stronger than the kind of robustness on which climate science has focused, i.e. invariant
results across changes in parameter value, or across models based on the same commitment
to physical mechanism, but with slight differences in implementation (c.f. Parker, 2011).
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and public expectation can be found both on the side of scientific practice and
on the side of public choice theory. In the climate science literature, for ex-
ample, there has been a recent surge of interest in techniques for “propagating
uncertainty” through a model, converting its low-level uncertainties into an un-
certainty value over the model’s predictions. While these procedures serve an
important function, they can easily be misinterpreted: a measurement of the
contribution of low-level uncertainty to high-level uncertainty is not a measure-
ment of high-level uncertainty itself. Any complete assessment of high-level
uncertainty must also take into account the contributions of idealizing assump-
tions and corresponding trade-offs in scientific values. In the case of choice
theory, a major symptom is found in the precautionary principle, which takes
disagreement amongst scientists as an excuse to jettison formal decision theory.
I elaborate on this point and defend my own view on how to manage high-level
uncertainty for policy choice in the next section; I return to the question of
uncertainty management in climate science in Section 5.
3 Decision Theory and Integrated Subjectivism
Formal decision theory weighs possible outcomes by their utility (conversely,
loss) and the probability they obtain in order to calculate action. The most
typical rule here is that of “maximizing expected utility,” or “minimizing loss”:
pick the action a ∈ A which for outcomes O
and loss function L minimizes
∑
oi∈O
P (oi|a)L(oi)
In the context of the present discussion, I assume a broadly ecumenical version
of formal decision theory, which takes action to be calculated somehow from
probabilities over outcomes and the utility of those outcomes (and perhaps
other values as well, for instance degree of risk aversion).
This notion of decision theory subsumes a variety of procedures in addition
to maximization of expected utility. For instance, instead of taking expectation,
one might take the mode or median of the distribution as most significant for
guiding action; instead of assessing outcome probabilities directly, one might
work with a more complex function of the probability distribution, say to repre-
sent uncertainty aversion. A classic example of such non-expectational decision
theory is the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979); for some more
recent examples, see Thalos and Richardson (forthcoming) and Hahn (2013).
Also subsumed under this vanilla notion are formal approaches which employ
simpler functions of probabilities, for instance a minimax rule which discards
probabilities over outcomes altogether, and simply picks the action which mini-
mizes maximum loss. These diverse procedures are united by their commitment
to calculating actions on the basis of a mathematical representation of the de-
cision problem. Rules may then be evaluated in terms of their sensitivity to the
mathematical structure of relevance in a given context. For instance, minimax
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may make sense when choosing actions in a game against a malicious opponent,
but it does not make sense when choosing actions in a natural environment of
stable relative frequencies.
The value of upholding decision theory in this sense is twofold. First, I
believe it accurately characterizes how humans do indeed make decisions. We
value or prefer some outcomes more than others, we believe some outcomes more
likely than others, and we choose how to act on the basis of these two weightings.
From this descriptive perspective, the functions P and L may be thought of
as “subjective”: they describe properties of the subject making the decision.
Second, translating difficult decision scenarios into quantitative mathematical
problems allows us to calculate rational responses when the problem at issue
is too complex or unwieldy for easy intuitive analysis. In this context, one
might argue that only particular functions P and L are rational, for instance,
the unique P which maximizes entropy. From this normative perspective, one
might interpret the functions P and L as “objective,” i.e. characterizing rational
assignments with validity in the world independent of any particular agent’s
actual degrees of belief while making a decision.
One may, of course, endorse the mathematical side of formal decision theory,
but interpret its parameters as representing subjective properties of a particu-
lar agent (e.g. Savage, 1972). Typically, on this subjectivist interpretation, the
normative constraints on the assignment P are purely internal, e.g. internal con-
sistency or coherence; no attempt is made to prescribe a single distribution as
rational for all agents. Subjectivism in this sense always permits the quantifi-
cation of high-level uncertainty since, in the absence of consensus, a probability
distribution may be generated from an individual’s personal assessment of the
relative importance of competing scientific values. A prominent worry about
the application of subjectivism in the context of policy choice, however, is that
the probability distribution used in the decision calculation is not subject to any
external, objective constraints, yet the decision being made will affect society
as a whole, not just the individual who defined P . Nevertheless, a brief exami-
nation of the stifling effect of non-formal decision rules on rational debate will
illustrate why even subjectively assigned probability distributions are preferable
to approaches which abandon mathematical representation altogether.
As a representative case, consider one of the most prominent qualitative
rules for policy choice, the precautionary principle. Although there are many
formulations of the precautionary principle (Manson, 2002), it typically invokes
a necessity to act if an outcome involving irreversible environmental damage is
possible (regardless of the degree to which it is probable). As usually interpreted,
the principle violates formal decision theory because: a) rather than weigh costs
and benefits across all outcomes, it singles out a distinguished class of outcomes,
those involving environmental damage; and b) the relative probabilities of these
outcomes are not taken into account, their mere possibility motivates action.
Typically, the precautionary principle is triggered by scientific uncertainty about
the potential effects of an action and is then used to ban that action, for instance
the planting of genetically modified crops (Tait, 2001) or the building of schools
with exposure to radio frequency fields (Foster et al., 2000).
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However, if the descriptive claim that actual agents make choices on the
basis of weights across the probabilities and utilities of outcomes is correct, then
invoking the precautionary principle shuts down rational debate. For example,
if you and I disagree about whether or not to take a particular action a, where
the potential outcome o involves environmental damage, then we either disagree
about how likely the outcome is, P (o|a), how terrible it is, L(o), or perhaps
in our respective degrees of aversion to risk or uncertainty, which might be
quantified in various ways. If you invoke the precautionary principle in our
argument, you obscure which of these values we actually disagree over. But
this is dangerous to public discourse, because we should take different actions
to resolve our disagreement in each case. A disagreement about P might be
resolved by appealing to more data or further modeling, a disagreement about
L will require an elucidation of our respective moral norms, and a disagreement
about risk aversion might simply be irresolvable. If these quantities are explicitly
represented as distinct components of the decision-making calculation, as they
are in formal decision theory, then the locus of our disagreement can be clarified
and effectively addressed.4
So, policy decisions should be framed in the context of formal decision theory,
but the parameters of a decision-theoretic model should be open to debate.
This allows for a more effective means of locating disagreement and targeting
discussion than attempts to jettison decision theory in favor of value-biased
qualitative guidelines such as the precautionary principle. However, this in turn
implies that in the context of policy decisions informed by scientific models
exhibiting high-level uncertainty, we will need to place a probability distribution
somehow over possible outcomes. How can this be done?
The first point to emphasize is that, even if the model (or modelers) offers
no recommendation for a probability distribution over outcomes, nevertheless,
some distribution can be assigned. At the very least, one could assign a dis-
tribution subjectively, constrained only by norms of internal coherence. Even a
purely subjectivist theory of such probability distributions is constrained by ra-
tional norms on probability change (e.g. Bayes’ rule). At least in finite contexts,
initially divergent probability assignments will converge on underlying “objec-
tive” probabilities when updated on enough additional evidence, mitigating the
worry that their “arbitrary” character defeats rational decision making.
More importantly, however, we may be able to do even better than this. If
the only aspect of our decision-theoretic model which comes from our scientific
model is the probability distribution over outcomes, and that distribution was
itself assigned arbitrarily due to our high-level uncertainty, we have taken very
4If the precautionary principle is understood as topic neutral, then it can be interpreted
as an instance of a formal decision rule, e.g. maximin (Hansson, 1997), minimax regret (Bret-
teville, 1999), or even a form of expected utility calculation (Gollier et al., 2000). Once the
principle is interpreted formally, however, it invites the kind of transparency of debate advo-
cated here. For instance, since maximin chooses an action without reference to probabilities
over states, it is plausible only for strategic interactions against a malicious opponent or under
conditions of complete ignorance about nature, preconditions which may fairly be challenged
in any environmental policy debate. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for helpful
insight on this point.
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little from the science. In fact, we have only taken the list of possible out-
comes, leaving behind information about why these particular outcomes have
been identified, or how they relate to the low-level parameters in the model. Yet
this information may be relevant for our decision. If, for example, parameter
α has a large effect on whether a particular outcome of interest obtains, while
parameter β has a very small effect, it is in our interest to make more careful
measurements of α in order to improve the quality of our decision, even if more
precise values for α do not reduce our overall high-level uncertainty.
The solution I explore in the following section is integrated subjectivism. The
idea is to integrate subjective parameters relevant for decisions into a scientific
model, which may otherwise be interpreted objectively, i.e. as characterizing
aspects of the world independent of any agent’s attitudes or values. Rather
than simply summarize the model’s predictions with a bare probability dis-
tribution, richer aspects of the scientific model are retained side by side with
parameters for the decision-maker’s loss function, risk aversion, prior beliefs,
etc. The idea is to transform a scientific model into a decision-theoretic one in
which objective parameters (about the world) and subjective parameters (about
the agent) peacefully coexist. By integrating these subjective features into an
objective model, qualitative and quantitative constraints on rational decision
making may emerge that are independent of the values of subjective parameters
themselves. As they apply to any rational agent, these constraints can then
inform policy choice, isolating the particular subjective parameters of greatest
relevance for resolving any residual disagreement.
Integrated subjectivism characterizes a general attitude toward the develop-
ment of models for policy decisions, not a deterministic recipe. The question of
how many subjective parameters and how much objective structure to incorpo-
rate in an integrated model should be determined pragmatically on a case by
case basis. If there is widespread consensus on a model’s predictions and the
ranking of outcomes by loss, there is no need for an explicit integrated model.
If there is consensus on the space of relevant models, though not their relative
value, and risk is not a factor, then Bayesian decision theory may be applied.
In this case, the “subjective” parameters are the utility function and the prior
probability distribution over models, and the “objective” parameters are the
likelihoods (conditional probability distributions) associated with each model.
A Bayesian model such as this is thus the simplest example of an integrated
subjectivist model. However, there are contexts in which scientific models do
not provide determinate likelihoods and policy-makers disagree on both utili-
ties and risk—both economic and environmental policy debates plausibly exhibit
these features. In these circumstances richer integrated subjectivist models may
be able to constructively inform policy decisions. The possibility of rich inte-
grated models and examples of how they may inform policy are illustrated in
the following case study from the history of economics.
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4 An Example: Optimal Monetary Policy
This section examines a sequence of models in the literature on optimal mone-
tary policy.5 We shall see that, by supplementing models initially intended to
characterize objective features of the world with subjective parameters, novel
qualitative and quantitative constraints on rational policy emerged and loci of
policy disagreements were made more precise.
Friedman (1953) addressed the topic of optimal monetary policy by treating
it as a question of how countercyclic action could be used to increase the stability
of an inherently fluctuating system. Levels of (total) income fluctuate as a
function of both natural pressures and policy interventions, each of which is
itself susceptible to fluctuation. This motivates the model
Y (t) = Q(t) + U(t), (1)
where Y (t) is the level of total income (e.g. GDP); Q(t) is the effect of policy
at time t (not an intervention made at t, but the effect at t of policy whenever
implemented); and U(t) is the fluctuation in income due to factors other than the
intervention. The model is general enough to capture any fluctuating economic
quantity of interest, and has been influential in the literature on optimal policy
considered generally.
Friedman’s insight was that, if monotonic trends are discounted, the stability
of Y (t) can be measured by its variance, σ2Y . Then the relevant equation for
assessing the stabilizing effects of policy is given by
σ2Y = σ
2
Q + σ
2
U + 2rQUσQσU (2)
where rQU is the correlation between Q and U . This setup allows Friedman to
argue for the novel result that not all countercyclic interventions are stabilizing.
Of course, if rQU is positive, i.e. interventions are “in the wrong direction,” they
destabilize. The real surprise here is that rQU may be negative, i.e. interventions
push income “in the right direction” (toward the mean of Y (t)), yet the overall
effect is an increase in σ2Y , i.e. instability increases.
(2) is intended as a model of objective factors in the world. Friedman is
concerned with our level of uncertainty about these factors, but he does not
explicitly represent this uncertainty in the model. Friedman’s policy recom-
mendations turn on his doubts about our ability to sufficiently reduce our un-
certainty about those factors crucial for making effective policy decisions, such
as σQ or rQU . This conclusion is in line with Friedman’s general stance against
overly activist / interventionist government policy. However, we can also see
this stance reflected in the choices Friedman made concerning the relevance of
various objective factors while building this model. For instance, his choice to
include the effects of policy, but not policy actions themselves, implicitly down-
plays any relevance of the particulars of policy choice for his conclusions about
the possibility of optimal policy in general.
5I previously discussed this example in Isaac (2013). This discussion expands and supple-
ments that one, focusing here on norms for policy rather than general norms for science.
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An economic tradition with radically different theoretical commitments is
the targets and instruments approach of Tinbergen and Theil (e.g. Tinbergen,
1952). This approach embraces an activist attitude toward government policy,
and reveals this attitude in models which explicitly relate “targets,” properties
of the economy (more generally society) of interest, to “instruments,” policies
or political actions. In general, many targets and instruments interact simulta-
neously, but the simplest model in this approach is
y = aP + u, (3)
where y is the target (Friedman’s Y ), P is the policy instrument, a calibrates
the effect of P on y, and u represents exogenous influences on y (Friedman’s U).
A fundamental result in this approach is the principle of certainty equivalence,
which states that, if a is known, then optimal policy when u is unknown is
equivalent to optimal policy when u is known (Simon, 1956; Theil, 1957).
Brainard (1967) begins the process of reconciling these two approaches by
weakening the assumptions necessary for certainty equivalence. Beginning with
(3), he considers the possibility of uncertainty about a. Although P is known
to the policy-maker, if a is not, then the problem of determining optimal policy
is greatly complicated. More generally, Brainard allows for the possibility of
interaction between u, a, and P , capturing the fact that changes in policy may
affect the nature of exogenous influences on the target variable. For example,
a change in interest rate may alter the attitudes of consumers who do not
themselves take loans on the new rate, thereby changing the nature of their
influence on GDP. These assumptions motivate the same transformation to (3)
that Friedman performed on (1), although Brainard will put it to a different
purpose:
σ2y = σ
2
aP
2 + σ2u + 2rauσaσuP. (4)
This model may be interpreted as a description of either objective features
of the economy, or of the policy-maker’s subjective state of uncertainty about
these features. Brainard interprets the variances here as uncertainties about
the values in (3), yet Friedman interpreted the variances in the mathematically
analogous (2) as objective summaries of fluctuations in (1). Crucially, choice of
interpretation may be made after the model has been mathematically manipu-
lated. In particular, since (3) explicitly includes a value for the policy-maker’s
action, Brainard can combine it with a loss function to derive a decision-theoretic
model. Use x¯ to indicate the average of x, E(x) to indicate the expectation of
x, and L to indicate loss. Following common practice in statistics, Brainard
assumes loss is equivalent to mean squared error:
E(L) = E(y − y∗)2, (5)
where y∗ is the desired value of y. This is equivalent to
E(L) = (y¯ − y∗)2 + σ2y. (6)
Substituting (3) and (4) into (6) allows Brainard to derive
E(L) = (a¯P + u¯− y∗)2 + σ2aP 2 + σ2u + 2rauσaσuP, (7)
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which he then differentiates with respect to P in order to state the relationship
between optimal policy P ∗ and characteristics of u and a:
P ∗ =
a¯(y∗ − u¯)− rauσaσu
a¯2 + σ2a
. (8)
Brainard’s analysis is an instance of integrated subjectivism in the sense
defined in the previous section. It unites equation (3), which represents ob-
jective aspects of the economy, equation (6), which represents the subjective
beliefs and values of the policy-maker, and equation (4), which may be inter-
preted as either objective or subjective, within a single integrated model. From
a mathematical standpoint, the integration of these equations is a matter of
straightforward substitution of identities; from a conceptual standpoint, how-
ever, models unambiguously representing the world and the policy-maker have
been transformed into a single, heterogeneous model, aspects of which equiv-
ocate on these two interpretations. For instance, the variables on the right of
(8), which were interpreted subjectively in the derivation of (7), can be given
objective empirical significance if they are interpreted as measurable properties
of the previous economic cycle.
This heterogeneous model allows the derivation of some surprising qualita-
tive and quantitative constraints on optimal policy. For instance, a counterin-
tuitive consequence of this analysis is that it is not always optimal to act to
bring y¯ maximally close to y∗. As the policy-maker adjusts policy on succes-
sive economic cycles, closing only part of the gap between expected and desired
values of y may allow for a more efficient convergence on y∗ in the long run. A
particularly striking instance of this principle obtains when there is very high
positive correlation between a and u. Under these conditions, it may actually be
optimal in the short term to act to move y¯ away from y∗, i.e. move the expected
value of y further from the desired value. Intuitively, if moving y¯ in the “wrong”
direction reduces the variance in u (because rau is positive) enough, then the
overall loss may be smaller since the increase in distance between y¯ and y∗ is
counterbalanced by the reduction in σ2y (Brainard, 1967, 416–7).
Although Brainard’s model illustrates the recommendation of the previous
section in the sense that it converts a scientific model into a decision-theoretic
one, one might nevertheless object that it is inappropriate to call it “subjec-
tive.” The notions of “loss” and “expectation” characterized in (5) are only
metaphors. “Expectation” is just average, a purely mathematical notion, while
the mean squared “loss” function employed is widely agreed upon by statisti-
cians, and chosen for mathematical convenience, not because of any contentious,
subject-dependent norms. Thus, these quantities are really better understood
as “objective,” i.e. matters of mathematical elegance and widespread agreement
which do not depend in any irreducible way on properties of a single agent. I
agree with these points to some degree, but they are mitigated by the final step
in our example, which demonstrates the constructive value of incorporating ir-
reducibly subjective risk aversion into the model.
Mitchell (1979) completes the reconciliation of the Friedman analysis with
the targets and instruments approach by incorporating a new parameter into
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equation (6), 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1:
E(L) = γ(y¯ − y∗)2 + (1− γ)σ2y. (9)
Mitchell calls γ the “risk aversion parameter” and states it “may be subjec-
tively picked by the policy-maker” (913). The value of incorporating this new
parameter into the model is that Friedman’s model and Brainard’s generaliza-
tion of the targets and instruments approach each fall out as special cases. If
γ = 1/2, we get Brainard’s model, and variance and deviation from the target
receive equal weight in calculating the loss function. If γ = 0, we get Friedman’s
model, where the particular target y∗ is irrelevant, and the only goal of policy
is to dampen cyclic activity in the economy. As γ grows closer to 1, the policy-
maker becomes less and less “risk averse” (as she cares less and less about the
predicability (variance) of the target).
The difference in the pre-theoretic commitments of Friedman’s non-interventionist
approach and of the more activist targets and instruments approach is now ex-
plicitly quantized in the decision calculation. By substituting (3) and (4) into
(9), Mitchell can derive qualitative and quantitative results about the relation-
ship between γ, P ∗, y∗, and σ2y. For example, as risk aversion grows in a specific
(but plausible) range, the strength of its effect on σ2y also grows, implying that
the more risk averse you are, the more precisely you must specify your degree of
risk aversion in order to calculate optimal policy (Mitchell, 1979, 917).6 Results
such as this do not tell the policy-maker what degree of risk aversion to adopt,
this is subjectively up to her, but they rationally constrain how that subjective
parameter interacts with policy choice, for instance how precisely it must be
stated in order to calculate a specific action.
The models of Brainard and Mitchell demonstrate how integrated subjec-
tivism is possible as a strategy for generating decision-theoretic models from
scientific models. Such models can be used to generate richer qualitative and
quantitative constraints on policy choice than those which simply weight out-
comes by a probability distribution. Furthermore, supplementing them with
irreducibly subjective parameters such as risk aversion can have the effect of
sharpening debate by illustrating the precise effects of contentious subjective
value commitments on policy choice. This example by no means constitutes a
recipe for applying integrated subjectivism in all cases. Nevertheless, it shows
the potential power of the approach for both a) making use of information in a
scientific model not captured by its predictions alone, and b) motivating rational
constraints on policy choice by examining the interaction between objectively
and subjectively interpreted parameters.
6I omit the full details of the argument in the interests of space, but here’s a sketch:
Mitchell substitutes his expression for P ∗ back into (4) and differentiates with respect to γ
in order to determine the sensitivity of the minimum σ2y on γ. Since the second derivative is
negative when a¯ > 2σa and γ is low, the function is concave in this range and, as γ shrinks,
minimum σ2y changes more and more rapidly.
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5 Applications in Climate Science
The literature on the management of uncertainty in climate science is vast, and
I will not pretend to survey it comprehensively here, nor to provide my own
concrete model. Rather, I hope to draw from the above discussion a few small
morals on some targeted points in this literature.
First, a quick overview of the nature of the problem. In order to assess long-
term trends in climate change, and in particular the relationship between human
activities, such as burning fossil fuels, and warming trends, there has been a
concerted effort in recent decades to build large computer models of the earth’s
climate. Many discussions of the uncertainty in these models focus on two types
of uncertainty: parametric uncertainty and structural uncertainty (e.g. Tatang
et al., 1997; Webster et al., 2003; Biddle and Winsberg, 2010).7 Parametric
uncertainty is just low-level uncertainty: uncertainty about the value of pa-
rameters such as ice albedo, quantity of human CO2 emissions in a given year,
rate of oceanic heat uptake, etc. These parameters are related to each other
via mathematical equations, and structural uncertainty is uncertainty about
the validity of these equations. This includes both uncertainty due to the lack
of a confirmed theory about the relationship between particular quantities and
uncertainty due to the acknowledged use of approximation methods in the equa-
tions in order make computer simulation feasible. This structural uncertainty
constitutes only one contributor to what I have called high-level uncertainty.
A third type of uncertainty taken to be of particular interest arises due to the
existence of a plurality of distinct models offering conflicting predictions about
future scenarios (Parker, 2006). These models make different structural assump-
tions and typically have different virtues (e.g. perform differently at reproducing
short-term vs. long-term past data; more realistically capture different aspects
of the mechanism underlying climate change; were tuned on different data sets;
etc.). Just like the conflicting statistical and biological models of cane toad
migration posited in Section 2, there is no consensus method for assessing their
respective merits. Furthermore this plurality appears to be irreducible. Lenhard
and Winsberg (2010) argue that irreducible pluralism follows from our inability
to analytically determine the relative contributions of different components of
the model to its overall outcome. Without such a “diagnosis,” we cannot assess
the relevant similarities and differences across distinct models, and thus have no
basis for expecting convergence in their predictions (260). Parker (2006) iden-
tifies a number of distinct difficulties for picking a single “best” climate model:
pluralism of attitudes toward simplifying assumptions (352); difficulty in assess-
ing quality of model predictions (353); lack of consensus on a measure of overall
model quality (354); no clearly superior retrodiction of past data (356). The
de facto effect of these difficulties is climate model pluralism for the foreseeable
future. For the sake of a label, call uncertainty about how to reconcile the
predictions of distinct models “plurality uncertainty.”
7Other types of uncertainty frequently discussed include uncertainties about initial con-
ditions, data, and boundary conditions. The first two are typically instances of low-level
uncertainty, while the third typically contributes to high-level uncertainty.
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Perhaps the greatest insight following from the above discussion for the cli-
mate policy debate is that plurality uncertainty is not a qualitatively distinct
problem, but is continuous with structural uncertainty. Both contribute to
high-level uncertainty, and were treated interchangeably when the concept was
introduced in Section 2. The reason is that both types of uncertainty contribute
to high-level uncertainty in precisely the same way: assessment of either struc-
tural or plurality uncertainty requires (implicit) commitment to a weighting
over scientific values,8 yet there is no consensus theory of how this weighting
translates into uncertainty over the predictions of the model. In general, the
problem of assessing how value judgments contribute to prediction uncertainty
is subject to the same difficulties independent of those judgments’ motivations.
This issue is obscured in the climate science literature by a relatively large de
facto consensus amongst climate modelers to rank the virtue of plausibility of
mechanism (“accuracy”) over all others when assessing structural uncertainty.
Here is a typical example:
Structural uncertainty in models arises because of inaccurate treat-
ment of dynamical, physical, and chemical processes, inexact nu-
merical schemes, and inadequate resolutions. Structural uncertainty
in atmospheric models can be reduced, for example, by increas-
ing model resolution, improving parameterization schemes, refining
model dynamics, and implementing state-of-the-art numerical meth-
ods. (Tatang et al., 1997, 21,925)
But reduction of structural uncertainty by these means does not necessarily
translate into a reduction in high-level uncertainty. To believe so would be to
commit the map-the-size-of-the-territory mistake: to assume both that the rich
detail of the target system may be approached arbitrarily closely and that this
approach improves the quality of the model. Despite the de facto endorsement
of this position by much of the climate modeling community, it cannot be sup-
ported as a general precept. Modeling, like scientific inquiry generally, must
make trade-offs between competing values. Prioritizing “accuracy” to the ex-
clusion of other values is insupportable in the long term, and contentious in the
short term.
This becomes clear when the climate case is compared to other sciences
of large-scale dynamical systems, e.g. economics, neuroscience, or ecology. In
each case, models which prioritize accuracy are complemented by models which
prioritize simplicity, generality, or empirical fit. A well-known example is the
Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model, which effectively generates complex popu-
lation dynamics from just two equations.9 While it is no substitute for a more
8Biddle and Winsberg (2010) also conclude that proposals to reduce structural uncertainty
involve value-laden decisions. Their emphasis is on the role of “non-epistemic” values in this
process. I agree with their discussion, but my point is weaker, merely that some values are
necessarily prioritized over others in a manner open to rational dispute.
9While this is one of the best known such models in philosophy, other examples abound: in
economics, supply and demand curves; in neuroscience, idealized models of neurons, such as
the McCulloch-Pitts or Hogkin-Huxley, and of learning, such as Hebb’s; in physics, idealized
14
complex and “realistic” model of any ecosystem of interest, it nevertheless is also
not replaced by such models. This is because the Lotka-Volterra model provides
a concise explanation of effects that are robust across a wide array of conditions,
for instance the “Volterra Property”: when both populations are subject to a
general decimation, the relative decrease in predators is greater than that of
prey (Weisberg and Reisman, 2008). By trading generality against accuracy,
the Lotka-Volterra model increases our understanding of the invariant causal
structure of predation-driven population dynamics, and with this increase in
understanding comes a corresponding increase in certainty—a more “accurate”
model that predicts violations of Lotka-Volterra effects should not be trusted in
the absence of independent empirical confirmation, or analytic understanding of
the source of the violation. In the context of decision making, the transparency
and conceptual clarity of a simple model such as Lotka-Volterra may be far more
useful than the opaque predictions of a large-scale, even if more “accurate,” one.
The complex role of value judgments in the construction of models ensures
that straightforward computational methods for assigning a probability distri-
bution over the outcomes of a single model do not actually reflect high-level
uncertainty. Such distributions may be assigned from frequency data on large
numbers of model runs (if the model is stochastic), or on model runs with slight
changes to parameter values (if it is deterministic). Typically, models are too
computationally demanding to allow for so many runs, hence the interest in
analytic methods for propagation of uncertainties through a model. Such meth-
ods translate probability distributions over parameter values, whether measured
by variance in the data (e.g. Webster et al., 2003), or by expert assessment of
priors (e.g. Wigley and Raper, 2001), into a probability distribution over model
outcomes. This provides a quantified assessment of the contribution to model
uncertainty made by low-level uncertainty about parameter values. However,
these calculations do not incorporate structural uncertainty or other value judg-
ments contributing to high-level uncertainty. One symptom of this neglect is
that possible, but “surprising” climate events, such as an abrupt change in ther-
mohaline circulation, receive no probability mass (Wigley and Raper, 2001, 454;
Webster et al., 2003, 298–9). Model construction requires choices about scien-
tific values, and a measure of uncertainty over model predictions adequate to
guide action must take these choices into account.10
These reflections should clarify why I disagree with those who take plural-
ity uncertainty to pose a unique conceptual problem for policy choice, and in
particular for the quantification of high-level uncertainty. Lenhard and Wins-
berg, for example, argue that one’s attitude toward the possibility of model
convergence should inform one’s attitude toward the possibility of assigning a
quantitative measure of uncertainty (QMU) over outcomes. They are worried
that pragmatists about the assignment of QMUs are not taking the possibility
models of springs and oscillators, the Ising model of phase transitions; etc. In all these cases,
more “realistic” or “accurate” models of the system of interest do not replace, or undermine
the importance of, the simpler model for purposes of explanation, conceptual clarification,
and the prediction and understanding of novel results.
10See Tebaldi and Knutti (2007, 2054–5) for a similar argument.
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that convergence will never obtain (i.e. irreducible pluralism) seriously enough:
But the convergence skeptic worries that [the] QMU pragmatist is
overly optimistic about making constructive use of the plurality of
models without a deeper understanding of the sources of model vari-
ation: QMU methods embed climate simulations into a framework
of probabilistic modeling the justification of which is itself uncer-
tain. Inevitably, some relatively strong assumptions have to go into
it. (Lenhard and Winsberg, 2010, 260)
But the assignment of probabilities to outcomes from single models faces exactly
the same problem: strong assumptions will have to be made about scientific
value for which there is no ultimate basis in understanding or unimpeachable
justification.11 True, my motivations for supporting the assignment of prob-
abilities are pragmatic: as argued in Section 3, such probabilities are both
necessary for rational decision making about climate policy and provide an ex-
plicit representation of one locus of possible disagreement during debate. But
the suggestion that instead of assigning probabilities one should simply “accept
model pluralism as . . . useful information for the decision process” (Lenhard and
Winsberg, 2010, 261) simpliciter offers policy-makers less rather than more of
the information available from modeling practice. When policy is decided, out-
comes will somehow be weighted probabilistically: if the modelers don’t do it,
then the politicians will (c.f. Schneider, 2001; Frame et al., 2007).
Nevertheless, I do support the conclusion that more than just a probability
distribution over outcomes should be communicated to policy-makers, if possi-
ble. But is integrated subjectivism of the form discussed in Section 4 possible in
climate science? There is already a concerted effort to integrate economic mod-
els with climate models (so-called “Integrated Assessment Models”), and the
importance of explicitly representing the subjective values of policy-makers in
these models has been defended by Morgan and Dowlatabadi (1996). Schneider
(1997) endorses this conclusion and advocates an active role for policy-makers
in collaborating with modelers to understand the limits of integrated models
while providing feedback on those subjective values which should be included
to maximize their efficacy for policy choice. Lempert et al. (2003) articulate an
approach employing simple simulation models and weighting plausible policy
outcomes with various standardized measures of value, such as the UN’s “Hu-
man Development Index.” Their strategy attempts to postpone disagreements
over long-term outcome probabilities as long as possible by searching for policies
that are satisfactory across a wide array of near-term possibilities.12
Typical Integrated Assessment Models are too large and complex to be sus-
ceptible to the kind of analytic results discussed in Section 4. Nevertheless,
there are some simple models that support analytic conclusions of relevance,
11c.f. Parker’s (2010) discussion of norms for assigning probabilities under plurality uncer-
tainty; it applies mutatis mutandis to high-level uncertainty about individual models.
12Although Lempert et al., 2003, explicitly reject a narrow version of “traditional decision
theory,” their own approach is still quantitative, and thus subsumed under the ecumenical
notion of decision theory adopted in Section 3.
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although these tend to reorient debate back onto precise outcome probabilities
(e.g. Weitzman’s (2009) analysis of the role of low probability “catastrophes” in
expected utility calculations; or Gollier, et al.’s (2000) analysis of the relation
between risk aversion and prudent action when information about risk sever-
ity changes over time). A successful analysis of the kind discussed above for
monetary policy would need to link the most contentious quantities for climate
policy (precise probabilities and utilities for low probability events) to more eas-
ily measurable (subjective or objective) quantities, though how this should be
done is by no means antecedently clear.
In summary, we may draw the following morals for the use of climate models
in policy debates:
1. When there are disagreements over utility or risk, uncertainty over climate
model outcomes must be quantified if policy debate is to remain rational.
2. No mechanical method for quantifying high-level uncertainty on the basis
of low-level uncertainties alone will ever provide a value-neutral measure
of uncertainty.
3. Pluralism uncertainty is not qualitatively distinct from structural uncer-
tainty. This is not to say pluralism uncertainty is not an important topic,
rather that the conceptual issues made transparent in the consideration
of pluralism uncertainty apply equally in the assessment of high-level un-
certainty for a single model.
4. Models that integrate subjective features of the policy-maker with objec-
tive features of the climate system have the potential to address the worry
that a mere probability distribution over outcomes cannot capture the
nuances of scientific uncertainty about climate models.
5. Both Bayesian approaches to model pluralism and Integrated Assessment
Models that explicitly represent policy-maker values constitute instances
of integrated subjectivism. If analytic results of the kind discussed for
optimal monetary policy are to be found, however, these models must be
substantially simplified (i.e. trade-offs must be made against the value of
“accuracy”).
6 Conclusion: A Plea
While we should indeed strive to find the firmest objective basis for the beliefs
and values that inform our policy decisions, this is not always possible. Some
relevant values, such as our aversion to risk, are irreducibly subjective; others,
such as our uncertainty about the future, may require subjective assessment
when action is urgent. Acknowledging that available evidence may rest on sub-
jectively assigned values should not be an excuse to abandon decision theory, nor
should it forestall the use of science in informing those values, e.g. by assigning
probabilities, even when the norms for how it should do so are contentious. In
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cases such as this, we should strive to integrate explicit representations of these
subjective values with those quantities that greater scientific consensus allows
us to treat objectively. Such integrated subjectivism can inform and clarify
debate, as well as suggest a path for moving toward rational consensus when
science provides less certain knowledge of the world than we desire.
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